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Agglomerations and firm performance: who benefits and how much? 
 
 
1. Introduction  
How does a firm’s knowledge moderate access to localization economies? Who gains 
and who loses from co-location?  The conclusions from the debate are far from clear 
thanks to an unresolved tension stemming from the consideration of firms’ internal 
knowledge in the localization economies topic: while more knowledge-intensive firms 
have more to lose and less to gain (Rigby and Brown, 2013; Shaver and Flyer, 2000), it 
is also said that firms with higher knowledge stocks benefit more from agglomeration 
(McCann and Folta, 2011). The present study responds to the recent calls of Rigby and 
Brown (2013), or MCCann and Folta (2011), among others, to carry on exploring how 
co-located firms benefit from agglomeration.  
Moving down from the regional level to the firm level as a unit of analysis, this paper 
focuses on how heterogeneous firms, with different routines, capabilities, resources and 
knowledge, that is, firm-specific assets or capabilities that are internal, capture 
externalities and, if so, whether these externalities are or are not asymmetrically gained 
within agglomerations. This work contributes to the geography of innovation strands 
and advances the research on localization economies, showing how firms with different 
innovation capabilities achieve localization gains differently. In other words, this study 
sheds light on the topic of whether returns within agglomerations and their localization 
externalities are asymmetrically and unevenly distributed among co-located firms.  
 
The rationale of this paper is as follows. Despite substantial amounts of work on the 
relationship between localization externalities and firm performance (e.g. Sorenson and 
Audia, 2000; McCann and Folta, 2011; Belussi and Hervas-Oliver, 2017), important 
issues remain unresolved and the debate is far from conclusive. There are studies which 
have found that localization has no effect or even has negative effects on performance 
(e.g. Gilbert et al., 2008; Audia and Rider, 2010), while others have found the link to be 
positive (e.g Folta, Cooper and Baik, 2006; Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009; 
McCann and Folta, 2011). Moreover, another unresolved discussion has focussed on the 
potential asymmetric benefits for located firms.  While it is agreed that not all firms 
benefit equally from being located in an agglomeration (e.g. Baum and Haveman, 1997; 
Rigby and Brown, 2013), some studies have concluded that strong firm-specific assets 
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or knowledge-rich firms are the main beneficiaries (e.g. McCann and Folta, 2011), 
while others say that, on the contrary, it is weaker firm-specific assets or knowledge-
poor firms which gain the most (Shaver and Flyer, 2000; Rigby and Brown, 2013). 
Again, there is no conclusive evidence. As such, our study attempts to shed light on 
these two different yet intertwined debates. 
 
Our point of departure is localization externalities1 occurring in agglomerations, and our 
overall aim is to evaluate the role of those externalities on a firm’s innovative 
performance. In particular, this paper seeks to provide empirical evidence on (i) whether 
co-location in an agglomeration improves innovation, that is, whether agglomeration 
benefits exist and, (ii) if so, how are they distributed among agglomerated firms, that is, 
equally or asymmetrically.  
Our study advances economic geography by intersecting it with the strategy literature 
and thus untangling the impact of localization externalities on a firm’s innovativeness, 
showing the mechanisms that link agglomeration and innovation and exploring potential 
asymmetric benefits in agglomerations and the differing groups of firms benefiting from 
them. The data used in the study encompass an entire country and multiple industries, 
allowing generalization of results. Using the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), a 
rich full-scale dataset covering 6,697 Spanish firms for the period 2004-2006 and 
regional-level data, our predictions are supported.  Spain was selected for study because 
it presents a high proportion of localization economies in Europe2.  The paper is 
organized as follows.  The following section formalizes our hypotheses. Then, in the 
third, we elaborate on our data and our empirical design. In the fourth section, the 
results are presented, together with a discussion. Finally, conclusions are developed and 
some areas for future research are discussed.  
 
2. Agglomeration and Firm Performance: hypothesis development 
 
The spatial concentration or agglomeration of economic activity leads to the emergence 
of externalities in many different forms. From the economics perspective, Marshall, 
Arrow and Romer (MAR)  externalities (e.g. Glaeser et al., 1992), focused on firms in 
                                               
1 Marshall (1890), Arrow (1962), and Romer (1986) put forward a concept, which was later formalized by the 
seminal work of Glaeser et al. (1992) and became known as the Marshall–Arrow–Romer (MAR) mode 
 
2 See Boix, 2009 
3 
 
the same industry, on the one hand, are economies of scale external to the firm but 
internal to a territorial system, facilitating agglomeration, due to the advantages of 
localization, such as the reduction of production costs, access to specialized inputs and 
suppliers and the better access to learning due to the presence of knowledge or 
technology spillovers (e.g. Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). The industrial district 
literature (MID), on the other hand, points out the social dimension  (e.g., Becattini, 
1990; Brusco, 1982) of agglomerations, facilitating a model of network-based and 
flexible specialization of production fueled by subcontracting, fostering the co-existence 
of competition and co-operation that positively impacts innovation (e.g. Camagni, 1991; 
Hervas-Oliver and et al., 2017). Overall, and considering both perspectives, localization 
externalities allow geographically concentrated firms in the same industry to learn from 
one other, to exchange ideas, to employ imitation business interactions, as well as 
accessing external knowledge and resources without monetary transactions (Saxenian, 
1994), that is to say, unintentional and uncompensated exchange of knowledge among 
firms, thereby helping to configure a firm’s specific capabilities and returns (Marshall, 
1890:32; Saxenian, 1994; Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2007). Claims of these 
effects have been supported by empirical observations of improved firm performance, in 
respect of innovativeness (Bell, 2005), financial performance (Kukalis, 2010) or patent 
activity (McCann and Folta, 2011). Localization externalities are the focus of our study. 
 
Agglomerations provide different types of externalities, like the existence of suppliers, 
abundant skilled labor or knowledge-abundant contexts, among many other factors, 
favoring inter-firm knowledge exchange (e.g. Tallman et al., 2004; Stuart and Sorenson, 
2003). Those externalities and knowledge rich contexts, therefore, might activate the 
development of absorptive capacity because firms need to build such a capacity in order 
to profit from their rich environment. As Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) seminal 
contribution points out, the learning environments in which firms operate condition the 
propensity to invest in absorptive capacity in order to capture externalities available 
there. Thus they say: “greater technological opportunity signifies greater amounts of 
external information, which increase the firm's incentive to build absorptive capacity” 
(1990:142). Thus, firms located in agglomerations are more likely than outsiders to 
increase their firm-specific assets or internal knowledge in order to tap into cluster 
resources. In other words, assuming that agglomerations produce externalities, ceteris 
paribus, a firm co-located in a region characterized by a relatively high level of its 
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industry specialization, is more likely to increase investment in its own firm-specific 
assets or knowledge to access externalities. In this vein, Arikan (2009:671-673) points 
out the fact that firms in agglomertions have to develop absorptive capacity to maximize 
the potential gains that clusters offer. Similarly, Tallman and Chacar (2011) argue that 
localization externalities3, which are deeply embedded, tacit, and inherently immobile 
(sticking to the territory), increase absorptive capacities for the local firms, because 
firms recognize the potentially available knowledge.  The term ‘absorptive capacity’ not 
only describes a firm’s ability to scan4 or evaluate information from its environment, 
but also to the ability to integrate new external knowledge into a firm’s internal 
innovation activities (Cohen and Levintahl, 1990). External knowledge is realized and 
integrated5 into a firm’s repository of knowledge at the point the firm assimilates and 
applies the new knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The level of absorptive 
capacity is therefore highly correlated with a firm’s innovation capability, in the sense 
of the resource-based view (e.g. Teece et al., 1997).  This idea is put forward in 
Escribano et al., (2009:98)  who posit that the way to isolate the role of absorptive 
capacity is by studying its moderating effect on the impact of external knowledge flows 
on innovation performance, that is, by studying the effects of the complementary 
combination of internal and external sources of knowledge. Therefore, we posit that the 
existence of externalities in agglomerations foster the development of firm-specific 
assets or internal knowledge to access to those potentially available external resources, 
forming synergies or combinations of internal and external sources of knowledge, 
assuming that the combination of internal and external knowledge, and the exploitation 
of synergies between them, facilitates innovation (e.g. Arora and Gambardella, 1990).  
Therefore, it is expected that internal and external accessed knowledge combination and 
its impact on a firm’s innovative performance is higher for co-located firms, vis-à-vis 
non-co-located ones, due to the fact that the existence of more external knowledge or 
resources (skilled labor, common infrastructure, supplies and so forth) will strengthen 
that effect. On the contrary, mostly because the poor external knowledge and resources 
                                               
3 They refer to communities of practice in clusters and the firm’s organization of resources in order to 
access that local knowledge. 
 
4 Scanning capability only refers to assessing external sources of knowledge, as Cassiman and Veugelers 
(2000) and Arbussa and Coenders (2007) state. 






available, non-co-located firms will present a weaker combination of internal and 
external knowledge, vis-à-vis co-located firms. Hence, it is expected that internal and 
external accessed knowledge combination and its impact on a firm’s innovative 
performance will be lower for co-located firms. In econometric terms, we expect a more 
robust and higher interaction effect (combination between internal and external sources 
of knowledge) on innovation for co-located firms. All in all we posit that 
agglomerations provide, therefore, the perfect setting for fostering a complementary 
combination of internal and external sources of knowledge and, for this reason, we 
expect that this combination will be reinforced in agglomerations. We use the term ‘co-
location’ for those firms in relatively high own-industry employment regions. Thus, our 
first hypothesis can be stated as follows, signaling an interaction effect on a firm’s 
innovation: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Agglomerations exert a positive impact of a co-located firm’s internal 
and external knowledge combination on its innovative performance  
 
Subsequently, this study restricts and focuses analysis only on co-located firms, that is, 
those firms co-located in a relatively high own-industry employment region (those with 
LQ>1 or just agglomerations in this study), and considers the heterogeneity amongst 
firms.  Firms have the potential to exploit resources, but vary in the extent to which they 
do so, especially in agglomerations (Hervas-Oliver and Albors-Garrigos, 2009), due to 
the fact that even though there are the same external resources for all firms, accessing 
those resources is moderated by a firm’s innovation capacity.  Asymmetry in firm-
specific assets or learning capabilities leads to an asymmetric access of external 
resources, thus corresponding to an asymmetric distribution of the benefits gained from 
accessing knowledge in an agglomeration: the same agglomeration in the same industry 
and region renders different gains to each co-located firm, depending on each firm’s 
knowledge base. Our paper posits that due to existing knowledge, heterogeneity or 
different innovation capacity is based on a firm-specific internal knowledge amongst 
firms, and thus, having differing capabilities to access and integrate external knowledge, 
agglomerated firms do not gain equally from their rich environments. Recent evidence 
supports this statement (McCann and Folta, 2011), indicating that  those firms co-
located in agglomerations which have a stronger knowledge base are better able to 
access and integrate external knowledge, thus gaining the most.  This suggests a linear 
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and positive effect between a firm’s innovation capacity and its gains in agglomerations. 
This argument, however, is only partial. 
 
The linearity of the strength of the above argument is clear,  but it neglects the fact that 
knowledge-rich firms can also contribute to agglomerations through knowledge 
spillovers (e.g. Canina et al., 2005) due to the intense competition existent in 
agglomerations (Sorenson and Audia, 2000). The argument has been put forward that 
firms possessing superior technologies and knowledge have an incentive to avoid 
agglomerations because they have much less to gain (Shaver and Flyer, 2000).  In 
addition to this less to gain idea, firms in an agglomeration face increased direct 
competition (Baum and Mezias, 1992) and knowledge flows easily among located firms 
(e.g. Tallman et al., 2004), imitation is pervasive, and inter-firm worker mobility is a 
reality (e.g. Saxenian, 1990). Therefore, the competitive dynamics of firms in 
agglomerations need to encompass also firms’ potential involuntary spillovers and the 
effect from a high level of competition. Furthermore, the gain from externalities should 
be measured as the net effect of the potential benefits accrued from learning in 
agglomerations, on the one hand, and the potential negative costs, on the other hand. In 
fact, the net effect can even be negative (Baum and Mezias, 1992; Sorenson and Audia, 
2000), depending on each firm’s assets or knowledge base. The fact that knowledge-rich 
firms have less to gain from agglomerations (Shaver and Flyer, 2000), and that 
knowledge-poor firms have more to gain, means that knowledge-rich firms might 
experience negative net effects from location in agglomerated areas. In all, we expect 
that, in agglomerations, the net effect of accessing to external sources of knowledge on 
a firm’s innovative performance from localization economies is moderated by a firm’s 
innovative capabilities. Taking the above mentioned opposed arguments, therefore, we 
posit that there will be asymmetric gains for agglomerated firms. In fact, as we have 
argued that there are two opposite arguments, one positive and other negative, we 
suggest that a curvilinear effect exists. Put another way, the interaction effect from the 
first hypothesis (combination between internal and external knowledge on innovative 
performance) is unevenly distributed among co-located firms, being dependent on a 
firm’s innovation capability. Therefore, that interaction effect on innovation will be 
curvilinear and moderated by a firm’s innovation capability. Thus, the second 




Hypothesis 2: The effect of internal and external knowledge combination on a co-
located firm’s innovative performance is curvilinear (inverted U-shape), being 
moderated by a firm’s innovation capability  
 
 
3. Empirical Design 
This study utilizes firm-level and regional variables from two different databases. The 
firm-level data comes from the Spanish CIS 2006, conducted in 2007 and covering the 
2004-2006 period. Our empirical analysis covers the effects of introducing innovative 
activities by innovatively active firms (6,697 firms). We control the selection by using 
Heckman (1979)6 and also test whether data suffer from common method bias using 
Harman’s single factor test (Greene & Organ, 1973); that is, loading all variables into 
an exploratory factor analysis and examining the rotated factor solution. No common 
method variance is identified.  
 
The variables we have used for our analysis are the following: Inno_product is a 
dependent variable which indicates whether an enterprise has introduced a new or 
improved product or service during the research period. This variable is measured as a 
dummy variable and has a value of 1 if the firm has introduced a new or improved 
product and/or service during the studied period, and 0 otherwise. Another variable is 
Internal_Capabilities, which refers to a firm’s internal resources of knowledge. The 
latter is the knowledge base or innovation capability.  In constructing this variable we 
have drawn on the work of Escribano et al., (2009), and also Lane et al. (2006) who 
emphasize the importance of human resources.  Our Internal_Capabilities variable is 
composed from a factor analysis that includes R&D internal expenditures, and the 
percentage of human resources devoted to R&D in relation to total employees. The 
resulting scores from a principal component analysis (PCA) represent the absorptive 
capacities. The two metric variables generating one single component from the analysis, 
through its scores, represents the dependent variable which explains 52.21 % of the 
variance (KMO = 0.7172, p<0.01). As usual in such analyses, we include control 
variables, such as Size, measured as the total number of employees, Industry 
                                               
6 Two-step Heckman procedures check for potential selection problems when restricting the sample to innovative 
active firms. Thus, one inverse Mills ratio (lambda variable) is generated and used for controlling coefficients, which 
are not significant. Available upon request. 
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classification, measured using 2-digit NACE-93 industry classification as dummies, and 
the OECD’s classification of low-, medium- and high technology intensive industries.  
 
External sources of knowledge are represented in our analysis by variables which 
measure the importance respondents gave for the innovation process of the use of 
external information sources (such as suppliers and customers).  These measures capture 
the role of un-traded interdependencies or externalities from related industries within 
value chains without monetary transactions (Saxenian, 1994). These variables arose 
from the question: how important have the following information sources been for the 
innovation activities of your enterprise? (Measured on a four digit scale from 0 to 3). 
 In the agglomeration literature emphasis is put on the role of access to tacit knowledge 
through interactions (e.g. Becattini, 1990).  As such, this paper focuses on untraded 
interdependencies (Storper, 1995), including:  learning from interactions with Suppliers 
and Customers, and/or through Trade Associations and participation in Events. By 
focusing on these four knowledge sources we address the external search strategies of 
firms and/or the external sources of knowledge they accessed. In a similar way to 
Laursen and Salter (2006) and with the purpose of using a single indicator for external 
sources of knowledge (due to methodological requirements below explained with the 
logit corrections on interactions) we constructed this variable as follows.  Each of the 
four sources are coded with either 1 when the firm in question reports that it uses the 
source to a high degree, and 0 in cases where there is only no, low, or medium use. 
Afterwards, the scores for the use of the four sources are added up so that each firm gets 
a score of 0 when no knowledge sources are used to a high degree, while the firm gets 
the value of 4 when all knowledge sources are used to a high degree (Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient = 0.71). Firms in the CIS questionnaire are geographically placed on a 
regional basis according to the location of the enterprises’ primary research and 
development facilities, at NUTS 2. We use the latter information in order to connect 
CIS data with a regional dataset containing localization indicators.   
The regional level data comes from the INE (Spanish Statistics Institute), the same 
governmental body which administers the CIS itself.  The specific source is the 2001 
Census of firms, which is presented using NACE-93 industry classification for each 
region (Spain comprises 17 regions plus Ceuta and Melilla, which are small cities in the 
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Northern part of Africa not included in the study7).  The location quotient is defined as 
LQ = /Lij/Li)/(Lj/L) where Lij is the number of jobs in the industry i in a region j, Li is 
the total number of jobs in the industry i in the country, Lj is the number of jobs in a 
region j, and L is the total number jobs in the country. If the LQ is more than 1 the 
region is more specialized in an industry than the country’s average and so we would 
conclude that that industry benefits from Marshallian localization economies (Bergman 
and Feser 1999, Porter, 2003). Basing the LQs on 2001 information limits any possible 
simultaneity bias; whenever possible the regional indicators are measured before the 
reference period of the CIS data (2004-2006).  
In addition, we also include other measures of potential externalities and control 
variables, such as Diversity, controlling for Jacobian economies (Jacobs, 1960) in the 
regions, measured by the inverse of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI),  
 
 
calculated for the number of firms in all  industries for each region, using Census data 
for 2001, where F is the number of firms’ local units in each industry, i refers to the 
region, and j to the sector. 
 
Additionally, we also include Population size and Density of the region variables, from 
data sourced from INE with reference to 2001. The study includes a total of 6,697 firms 
ranged over 181 industries. The LQs are calculated for a matrix of the 181 industries at 
3 digit NACE codes for 17 regions. Regional dummies also control for regional 
heterogeneity.  
From figure A-1 in the Appendix, we observe how our methodology is very sensible 
reflecting the real composition of industry specialization agglomerations in the Spanish 
regions. As observed in the matrix, we can easily identify common trends from the  
Spanish agglomeration facts (e.g. See Boix, 20098).  
 
                                               
7 The regions are Andalucía 01; Aragón 02; Asturias 03; Balears 04; Canarias 05; Cantabria 06; Castilla y 
León 07;Castilla-La Mancha 08; Cataluña 09; Comunidad Valenciana 10; Extremadura 11; Galicia 12; 
Madrid 13; Murcia 14; Navarra 15; País Vasco 16; Rioja 17. 
 
 
8   Boix, R. (2009) 











Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. See table 1.  
 
Insert table 1 about here 
 
Cross-section data restrains from unobserved firm heterogeneity. Besides, the reverse 
causality between innovation and internal and external sources is also a major point to 
tackle.  In our views, the only way we can control for this potential reverse causality is 
the way in which the questionnaire is designed. In fact, the CIS questionnaire is 
designed in a way that perfectly distinguished innovation outputs and inputs and, 
clearly, the variables utilized for capturing internal and external sources (independent 
variables) are clearly formulated and contextualized in a way that clearly represents 
inputs or explanatory variables. Similarly, the innovation output or dependent variables 
are also clearly formulated and contextualized in a way that clearly represents an output 
variable. Literature on this topic (see McCann and Folta, Rigby and Brown, and many 
others) has followed a similar formulation, albeit with different objectives, samples and 
countries. In any case, our study has no available instruments to check for endogeneity 
in our model formulation. Please, visit information about the CIS questionnaire to check 
our argument9.  
 
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
As our dependent variable (the introduction of product innovation) is binary, we have 
based our estimations on a logit model. In table 2, the general model is observed in six 
specifications. The first three ones show individual effects and the general model, while 
in the last three specifications (from 4 to 6) the first and second hypotheses are tested 
using the interaction effect and the analysis of its curve. In all the first three 
specifications, for all firms and then for the two groups of high and low industry 
specialization (cut-off point established at LQ value 1), we observed how the individual 
effects for Internal_Capabilities and External_Sources variables are all positive and 





significantly related to the innovation outcome. These individual effects, however, are 
not part of the hypothesis but the interaction effect. For this reason, in table 2 
throughout the 4, 5 and 6 specifications, we split the sample in two subsamples for the 
purpose of testing interactions (first hypothesis). The reason of this split is because 
following Ai and Norton (2003), the nonlinear nature of the logit model means that the 
marginal effect on an interaction effect is not simply the coefficient (and associated 
odds ratio) of their interaction.  We split the sample into two groups (see McCann and 
Folta, 2011), addressing firms’ locations in LQs lower or higher than 1 because 
econometrically it is necessary due to the third order effect (LQ, Internal_Capabilities 
and External_Sources variables) and its difficulty to be treated in logit regressions. 
Subsequently, we proceed to apply Ai and Norton’s (2003) recommendations to 
examine the interactions. As mentioned above, the regional literature has usually 
recommended to set the cut-off point at 1 value (e.g. Bergman and Feser 1999), even 
though this is just a convention. As regards control variables, such as Population and 
Density, it is worth mentioning their poor role capturing the regional additional effects. 
In general, a negative relationship between Population and innovation is observed for 
LQ>1, and a positive one between Density and innovation outcome. In the case of 
LQ<1 regions, there is not any relationship, but for the whole sample we observe the 
same as the one encountered for LQ>1. This is explained by the fact that the most 
specialized regions are also the ones with higher density, irrespective of the population.  
 
First of all, addressing hypothesis 1, we proceed by examining the interaction between 
internal capabilities (Internal_Capabilities) and external knowledge source variables 
(Internal_Capabilities X External sources variable) and its effect on innovation 
performance or output. This interaction effect is what we have considered as the 
absorptive capacity, following Escribano et al’s, (2009) thoughts.  In this part of the 
analysis the positive or the negative sign is the relevant result, showing or not the 
complementary combination of internal and external resources depending on the LQs. 
This produces empirical evidence of positive and statistically significant results related 
to the moderating effect of localization externalities on that combination. In 
specifications 4 (addressing the whole sample) and 5 (firms in relatively high own-
industry employment regions), the results is positive and statistically significant. In 
specification 6 (firms not located in relatively high own-industry employment regions), 
the results are not significant.   Corrections are presented graphically in figures 1 to 4 in 
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order to interpret results (following the above mentioned Ai and Norton, 2003). For this 
reason, in table 2 coefficients are used in order to show graphical corrections, instead of 
odds ratios. For the sake of brevity we focus on the graphic correction effects of the 
interactions for interpreting results and the first hypothesis in specifications 5 and 6 
from table 2. See table 2. 
 
Insert figures 1 to 4 
 
Figure 1 (table 2, referring to LQs>1, specification 5) shows the size effect of the 
interaction (LQ>1) when a firm is located in a region characterized by (relatively high 
own-industry employment) localization externalities. Then, figure 2 (table 2, referring 
to LQs>1, specification 5) shows the statistical significance of that size effect. The same 
effects are shown in figure 3 and 4 for the case of firms co-located in relatively low 
own-industry employment regions (LQs=<1) (table 2, specification 6, LQs=<1).  A 
comparison of figures 1 and 2 with figures 3 and 4 illustrates the different effect that 
agglomeration exerts on a firm’s innovative performance, showing that agglomeration 
externalities are important and that they matter when combining internal and external 
knowledge to increase returns. Results reflect the fact that for firms located in 
agglomerations there is a positive and significant interaction effect on innovative 
performance (see figures 1 and 2), whereas for firms not co-located in agglomerations 
(low agglomeration coefficients) the effect is not significant (figures 3 and 4). Thus, it 
can be stated that a firm’s co-location in an agglomeration reinforces and strengthens 
the complementary internal and external knowledge effect on innovation. See table 2 
and figures 1 to 4. The first hypothesis is confirmed. This is done due to the fact that the 
greater abundance of external sources of knowledge, as well as other externalities, 
reinforces that combination and its (interaction) effect on innovation, benefiting co-
located firms. Whereas, non-co-located firms (or those located in low LQs coefficients) 
cannot provide as good a combination of internal and external sources of knowledge, 
vis-à-vis co-located ones, due to the fact that there is less quantity and quality of 
external resources or externalities available in that particular industry-region territory.  
 
When addressing only the LQs >1 firms (those located in agglomerations) and the shape 
of the curve, rather than just the positive or negative effect of the interaction, as in the 
first hypothesis, then the second hypothesis will be tested. Moreover, again in table 2, 
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for firms co-located in agglomerations (LQs>1, specification 5), and in figures 1 and 2, 
hypothesis 2 is also tested.  Figure 1 shows for firms co-located in agglomerations a 
curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) effect (interaction on innovative performance), 
reflecting asymmetric gains moderated by firms’ innovation capabilities or knowledge 
base. A firm’s innovative capabilities, represented by its propensity to innovate 
(predicted probability y=1 in the figures), moderate asymmetrically the gains from the 
complementary combination shown in the first hypothesis in Figure 1. Innovation 
capability, depicted by a firm’s predicted probability to innovate ranges from 0 to 1, the 
latter being the maximum. This is a good indicator of a firm’s knowledge base. All in 
all, figure 1 highlights a key finding:  that the strongest interaction effect on innovative 
performance (Internal_Capability x External_Sources on Innovative Performance 
variables) occurs at the lower end of medium predicted levels of probability of being 
innovative or knowledge based (approximately 0.3 to 0.6), whereas the effect is less 
clear-cut for higher levels of predicted probability of being an innovator.  Put 
differently, the middle is the right point to be, because firms with weaker innovation 
capacity (up to 0.3) present a lower effect on innovative performance, probably due to 
their lack of accessing external knowledge, that is, a low absorptive capacity. Similarly, 
stronger firms with a higher innovative capacity (from 0.6 on) have less to gain, since 
they are already in a pattern of high innovation. Those ranging from 0.3 to 0.6, that is, 
an average innovative capability or knowledge base, have more to gain, because of the 
increasing return reported.  
In short, throughout the curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) graph shown in figure 1, three 
groups of firms can be identified: those firms gaining fairly well in innovative 
performance thanks to being located in agglomerations (innovation capability or 
predictive level of being innovative between 0.1 and 0.3); those which gain the most 
(between 0.3 and 0.6); and, finally, those still gaining but gaining the least (from 0.6 to 
1).  The latter group of firms is the one with the highest innovation capability, but 
present the lesser gains (compared to the average ones). Also shown is a group of  very 
high innovation capability firms which suffer a loss in innovative performance thanks to 
being located in agglomerations; this can be seen in the negative values or adverse 
selection reported by Shaver and Flyer (2000), although these are not statistically 
significant so as to be sustained. Overall, the striking heterogeneity shown in that 
curvilinear (inverted U-shape) line reflects and confirms the asymmetric gains or 
unevenly distributed gains referred to in hypothesis 2. Figure 2 also shows that in the 
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majority of cases the interaction effect is positive and significant at the two-sided 5% 
level, with some exceptions at the very high end of the predicted probability of being an 
innovator.  
 
What is the exact meaning of those results? This curvilinear interaction, reflected in an 
inverted U-shaped graph, shows that the low-medium  and medium innovative firms, in 
terms of innovation capacity,  gain the most in terms of innovative output by accessing 
externalities in agglomerations. This means that, ceteris paribus, a relatively high 
agglomeration of own-industry employment (LQs>1) benefits those firms with lesser 
probabilities to innovate, that is, the “weaker firms” or “average” firm-specific assets or 
medium knowledge-base intensive firms. They all have more to gain, while the really 
weak cannot effectively access, and those very strong in terms of capabilities have less 
to gain, as not all externalities will benefit them, given the fact that they are very strong 
in innovation capacity.   
In addition, as observed in models 2 and 3 in table 2, the effect of internal capabilities is 
stronger for non-co-located firms, a fact that confirms that non-co-located firms’ 
innovation patterns are mainly based on internal knowledge, due to the absence of good 
external resources in their locations. On the contrary, co-located firms use internal 
knowledge as a means of increasing the absorptive capacity and thus exploiting external 
knowledge highly abundant in their locations. The fact is even re-confirmed in 
specifications 5 and 6 in table 2. Extra robustness checks show that collocated firms are 
more innovative than non-collocated ones (at p<0.05; Chi-squared 6.46)10.  
Our results are in line with that part of the literature which has reported evidence of 
positive and significant links between localization and performance (e.g. Decarolis and 
Deeds, 1999) Besides, and going a step further, our results also suggest that  co-located 
firms experience asymmetric returns as McCann and Folta (2011) or Rigby and Brown 
(2013) have already predicted. Our results, however, contradicting those of McCann and 
Folta (2011), and differing slightly from Rigby and Brown, point out a different yet 
related inverted U-shape, unfolding thus the variety of possibilities available for co-
located firms. Besides, we have tested the data without Catalonia and Madrid, and 
results coincide, due to the fact that we are not measuring urban but industry 
specialization externalities. These results are available upon request11.   
                                               
10 We really appreciate one excellent reviewer’s suggestion on this point.  




Lastly, we have conducted a RAMSEY test to check linearity of data. The model is 
improved adding to Internal_Capabilities its quadratic form, but the overall results and 
hypothesis confirmation are just the same, not affecting our interpretation of results. For 
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